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The Porter hypothesis suggests a win-win  situation in the sense that environmental policy 
improves both  environment  and competitiveness.  The suggestion  received  strong  criticism 
from  economists  driven  by  the  idea  that  if  opportunities  exist, firms  do not  have  to be 
triggered by  an extra cost. In this paper a model is developed which confirms this point but 
which also draws attention to some general mechanisms that relax the trade-off considerably. 
Downsizing and modernization of firms subject to environmental policy will increase average 
productivity and will  have positive effects on the  marginal decrease of  profits and eriviron- 
mental damage.  o  1999 Acaderriic Piess 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In an article that attracted the attention of both economists and policymakers, 
Porter  [9] challenged  the  established  notion  that  tough  environmental  policies 
imply  private  costs  that  harm  the  competitiveness  of  a  country’s  industry,  by 
claiming precisely  the opposite.  For policymakers  (e.g., Gore [5])  this  idea  of  a 
possible  “win-win”  option was like manna from heaven, because  it relieved them 
of  the  difficult  trade-off  between  environmental  and  other  economic  targets. 
Economists, however, are by  nature sceptical about the idea of a “free lunch,” and 
some also critized this so-called “Porter hypothesis” in the sense that attention is 
distracted from the cost-benefit analysis of environmental policy, which is in their 
view the most important issue (e.g., Palmer, Oates, and Portney [S]). 
In short Porter’s argument is that tough environmental regulation in the form of 
economic  incentives  can trigger  innovation that may eventually increase  a firm’s 
competitiveness  and may  outweigh the short-run private  costs of  this regulation. 
‘This  research  was  initiated  under  the  HCM-programme  “Designing  Economic  Policy  for  the 
Management  of  Natural  Resources  arid  the  Environment.”  Support  from  the  research  programme 
PENED (No. 696) arid from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (No. 144.004)  is also 
acknowledged. We are very grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees. 
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His argument is mainly supported by  a large number of case studies where firms 
under strict environmental regulation prove to be very successful  (see, e.g., Porter 
and van der Linde [lo]). 
Empirical studies on competitiveness in the meaning of changes in the trade and 
investment  patterns  (e.g., Kalt  [7], Tobey  [13], Jaffe  et  al.  [GI)  do  not  find  a 
significant  adverse  effect  of  more stringent  environmental  policies.  The existing 
data are of course limited in their ability to measure the stringency of regulation 
but possible explanations mentioned are that the compliance costs are only a small 
fraction of total costs of production, that stringency differentials are small, and that 
investments  follow  the current  state-of-the-art  in  technology  even  if  this  is  not 
required by  the environmental regulation in that country. 
In the discussion following the appearance of the Porter hypothesis a number of 
attempts have been made to identify the mechanisms that can lead to a mitigation 
of the cost effect of environmental policy or can even lead to a win-win  situation. 
The dominant argument is that firms are not aware of  certain  opportunities  and 
that environmental  policy might open the eyes. The revenues  of these opportuni- 
ties  can then outweigh the costs of  compliance. One line of  thought  is that the 
external shock through environmental  regulation  may reduce intrafirm  inefficien- 
cies  and organizational  failures (see, e.g., Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagnk  [41), and 
may  move  the  firm  toward  its  production  possibility  frontier:  the  X-efficiency 
argument.  A  second  idea  is  that  firms  create  a  first-mover  advantage  by  the 
development  of  environmental  technology which  can be  beneficial  in later times 
when  other  countries  also  adopt  a  more  stringent  environmental  policy.  The 
standard  counterargument is, of  course,  that  in  rational  economic  modelling  it 
cannot be explained why firms do not see these opportunities by themselves, which 
at least implies that the argument does not have a general validity. It can be the 
case that innovation with the aim to reduce environmental  pollution also lowers 
production costs and can therefore even be beneficial without considering environ- 
mental  costs. For a rational  firm, however, the conclusion  must  be that environ- 
mental  policy is  then not needed to trigger  this innovation. The only arguments 
that remain  in this  discussion  are the possibility  of  positive  externalities  of  the 
additional R & D and the reduction of uncertainty to the firms about policy trends. 
In the context  of  strategic  trade models, where  consumption  takes  place  in a 
third country, increased competitiveness  means a shift of  profits from the foreign 
firm to the home firm. In a two-stage model where firms invest in R & D first and 
then choose output, it is possible  to construct  specific  examples in which foreign 
R & D decreases and home profits increase under an environmental tax, but again 
this result  has definitely no general  validity (Simpson and Bradford  I11  [12]). On 
the contrary, the basic story remains that governments have an incentive to distort 
the environmental  tax  downward from the Pigouvian level  in order to lower the 
costs of the home firm and to shift profits to the home firm (Barrett [ 11, Ulph [ 14]), 
which is sometimes referred to as “ecological dumping” (e.g., Rauscher  [111). 
The purpose of  this paper is to explore the validity of the Porter hypothesis  by 
considering  firms’ reactions  with  respect  to both  the type  and the quantity  of 
equipment in which  they  invest  in response  to changes  in  the production  costs. 
First  it is shown that an increase  in production  costs, brought  about by  environ- 
mental  policy,  triggers  a  restructuring  of  the  capital  stock  in  such  a  way  that ENVIRONMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS  167 
average productivity increases.  This can already be considered as an improvement 
of the competitiveness  of the industry (Porter and van der Linde [lo]), so that this 
part of the paper gives a formal basis to that point. It is, however, more interesting 
to see what  happens to net  profits, which  is the focus of  the second part of  the 
paper.  The  analysis  in  the  paper  is  based  on  a  model  where  firms  invest  in 
machines  of  different  ages.  Younger  machines  are  more  productive  and  less 
polluting  than older  machines,  but  are more costly  to buy  and to install  in the 
capital stock. Stricter environmental regulation, in the form of  an increase in the 
emission tax, will reduce the number of machines of all ages and therefore the size 
of the firm. However, the same tax increase generally also reduces the average age 
of the capital stock and thus increases its productivity. It follows that two effects 
can be distinguished: a “downsizing” effect and a “modernization” effect. Downsiz- 
ing refers to the reduction  of the total capital stock.3 Modernization  refers to the 
reduction  of  the  average  age  of  this  capital  stock.  Environmental  regulation 
accelerates the removal  of  older machines from the capital stock which increases 
its  prod~ctivity.~  It  is  important  to  note  here  that  in  the  actual  practice  of 
environmental  policy, existing capital is often exempted from the new and stricter 
regulation. The effects analysed in this paper then only occur for the ages of the 
capital stock on which the higher tax is levied. As a consequence, modernization is 
less  than  in  case  all  ages  of  the  capital  stock  are  subject  to  environmental 
regulation (e.g., Ellerman [31). 
The extra tax burden and the shift in investments and output are not profitable 
for the firm. This cost of  environmental regulation is, however, mitigated  by  three 
effects: downsizing leads to an upward pressure on prices, modernization leads to a 
higher productivity of the capital stock, and downsizing and modernization together 
lead to lower  emissions, so that an environmental  target can  be  reached  with  a 
lower  tax  than  in  the  absence  of  this  effect.  In  this  paper  a  situation  with 
homogeneous  capital, where  only  downsizing  occurs,  is  compared to a  situation 
with heterogeneous capital, where also modernization occurs. It is shown that the 
marginal  decrease  in  profits  is  lower  and the marginal  decrease  in emissions  is 
higher in the second situation. 
The implication  for the debate on the Porter hypothesis  is not that a win-win 
situation  can be  expected, but  the trade-off  between  improving the environment 
and the competitiveness  of  the home industry is  not as grim as it  is  sometimes 
suggested because of favourable changes in the composition of the capital stock. 
Section  2  presents  the  basic  model  and  Section  3  derives  the  optimal  age 
distribution  of  the  machines.  In  Section  4  the  effects  of  an  emission  tax  on 
productivity, profits, and emissions are given and a comparison is  made with the 
case of homogeneous capital. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
‘A  better environment will also have a positive effect on the productivity of  other factors through 
clean air, clean water, improved health arid so on, but this aspect will not be considered here. 
31t is  interesting  to  note  here  that  Nabisco  chairman  and  chief  executive  J. Greeniaus, when 
announcing the firm’s downsizing, stated that it “was necessary to improve the company’s competitive 
position  and to accelerate ‘strong sustainable earning growth’ in the next century” (Financial Times, 
June 25, 1996). 
Environmental regulations in the  1970s unintentionally accelerated the modernization of  the US. 
steel industry, although this does not mean that the premature scrapping of “obsolete” capital is socially 
beneficial,  because  such  plants  were  presumably  producing  output whose  value  exceeded variable 
production costs (Jaffe et al. [6], based 011 US. Office of Technology Assessment  [15]). 168  XEPAPADEAS AND  DE ZEEUW 
2. THE  MODEL 
Consider  a  firm  that can  invest  in  machines  of  different  ages.  Let  y  E [O,hl 
denote the age of  the machine and introduce the following notation: 
c(y)  is the output produced by a machine of age y,  with u’(y) I  0. That is, a 
newer machine cannot produce less output than an older machine. New machines 
are more productive because they embody superior technology. 
c(y)  is the running cost of a machine of age y,  c’(y)  2 0. 
s(y)  are emissions of  a machine of age y,  s’(y)  2 0. Older machines emit at 
least as much as newer machines. This might be the result of a natural deteriora- 
tion in the condition of the machine with the passage of time, and/or  the result of 
cleaner technologies being embodied in the new machines. 
Let  x(t,y)  be  the number of  machines  of  age y  operating  in year  t. Then total 
output produced in year  t  is defined as 
Assume that the firm has to pay an emission tax  T per unit  emissions. Then the 
cost  of  running  one machine  is:  c(y)  + ~s(y).  Therefore total  running  costs for 
year  t are defined as 
In practice  existing capital is often exempted from new and stricter environmental 
regulation. In the model this would imply that the tax  T is not levied on capital up 
to the maximum age h,  which is analysed in this paper, but only on capital up to 
the age k < h. As  a result, the downsizing and modernization  effects, which  are 
shown later on, only occur for that part of  the capital stock. In a world with new 
source performance standards, k = 0 and the analysis in this paper breaks down. If 
k > 0 the effects will be there but will be smaller, and the older capital will not be 
affected. It follows that the results  of  this paper only apply to regulatory institu- 
tions where an emission tax is levied on all polluters or at least on the pollution of 
some part of the existing capital stock. The last situation occurs, for example, when 
regulations put a cap on the amount of money a firm may be required to spend to 
come  into compliance  with  a  new  standard. Because  the size  of  the necessary 
expenditure is usually correlated with the age of the capital stock, this cap in fact 
implies that capital above a certain age is exempted from the new regulation. The 
previous  model  can  be  used,  but  the  age  h  should  then  be  interpreted  as  the 
maximum age of machines on which the emission tax  T  is actually levied. Finally, 
note that in practice  economic incentive  approaches to environmental  regulation 
(primarily  taxes  and tradable  permits)  are gradually  being  adopted, so that  an 
analysis based on an emission tax fits well with this development. 
We assume that markets  exist for machines of  any age from 0 to h. This is a 
strong assumption but it is somewhat relaxed  by  introducing a capital adjustment 
cost later on. Let b(y)  be the cost of buying a machine  of age y,  with  b’(y) I  0 
(older machines  cannot be more expensive than newer machines) and b(h)  = 0 (a ENVIRONMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS  169 
machine  at the maximum  age h  is not worth  anything).  For the analysis  in  this 
paper it is assumed that the cost  b of a used machine is given and that this cost 
does not depend on the other parameters of the model and the emission tax  7.  In 
fact, none of the parameters of  the model depends on the emission tax  7 so that 
the firm can only react to the tax by  adjusting the composition of the capital stock, 
which is the focus of  this paper. 
Let u(y,  t)  be the number of machines of age y  bought (if u(y,  t)  > 0) or sold (if 
u(y,  t)  < 0)  in year t.  The total cost or revenue to the firm from transactions in the 
machine  market  is  defined  as  b(y)u(y,t)  + i[~(y,t)]~,  with  the  second  term 
reflecting  the adjustment  costs in buying or selling machines. These costs are, for 
example, adaptation costs  or search costs. The quadratic  form  of  this  cost  term 
leads  to a  simple  expression  for optimal purchases  which  is  needed in order to 
make the rest of the analysis tractable. 
The firm  chooses  to buy  or  to  sell  machines  of  different  ages  in  order  to 
maximize profits, with p  the price of output. That is, the firm chooses at each point 
in time an age distribution of machines to maximize  profit^,^ 
This  is  an  infinite  horizon  optimal  control  problem  with  transition  dynamics 
described by a linear partial differential equation (Carlson, Haurie, and Leizarowitz 
[2]).  The transition  equation indicates  that the rate of  change in the number of 
machines  of  a given age, y,  is determined by  two factors. These are the reduction 
in the number of machines of that age as machines become older (the first term of 
the transition equation), and the reduction or increase in the number of machines 
brought about by the sale or acquisition of machines of the given age y  (the second 
term of the transition equation). The number of machines of each age at each time 
has  to  be  nonnegative,  while  the  initial  condition  on the number  of  machines 
implies that the firm starts with no new machines in the capital stock. 
The generalized Hamiltonian function for this problem is given as 
5We take a discount rate equal to zero because the analysis would otherwise become more complex 
without adding anything to the purpose of  this paper. 170  XEPAPADEAS AND  DE ZEEUW 
The first-order conditions for optimality, besides the transition dynamics in (l), are 
dH 
~  = 0,  or  u(y,t)  = A(y,t) -  b(y), 
dU 
dH  d  dH  dX 
+--,  xy=- 
dt  dx  dy dx,  dY ' 
--  -  NY,  t> - 
or 
In  order  to  obtain  tractable  analytical  results  from  the  preceding  optimality 
conditions, we consider the firm at the steady state, in which case dx/dt = 0 and 
dA/dt = 0. By  suppressing t  and then denoting  dA/dy = h, and dx/dy =  X, the 
optimality conditions at the steady state can be written as 
The optimality conditions corresponding to the steady state are equivalent to the 
optimality conditions of  the optimal steady-state problem (OSSP) associated with 
problem (1). The OSSP is defined (Carlson, Haurie, and Leizarowitz [2])  as 
The OSSP problem  is  an optimal  control problem defined over  ages  y E [O,h], 
with  as state variable  the  number  of  machines  of  a  given  age  and  as  control 
variable the sales or acquisitions of machines of this same age. The OSSP problem 
can be thought of as a situation where the firm chooses the optimal age distribu- 
tion of the machines in steady state, which results from some exogenous shock. 
In our model the exogenous shock is a change in the emission tax that changes 
the optimal  age  distribution  of  the machines. In order to determine  the effects 
from changes in the tax parameter we examine next the optimal age distribution of 
the machines as determined by  the optimality conditions (2), (3.11, and (3.2). 
3.  THE  OPTIMAL AGE  DISTRIBUTION 
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The boundary condition of  this  fixed-horizon  optimal control problem, A(h) = 0, 
yields the constant of integration in (4), 
Therefore, A(y) is given by 
The value of  A  as given by (5) reflects the benefits from installing one machine of 
age y  and keeping it until it becomes of maximum age. From (2)  the optimal sales 
or acquisitions  of  machines of age y  is given by 
Note that 
u*(y>  $0,  as ~(y)  $ b(y), 
which is intuitively clear because  A denotes the benefits and b denotes the price of 
new machines. 
The stock of machines of age y  is partly determined by  sales and acquisitions of 
machines  of that age and partly inherited from sales and acquisitions in the past. 
The set of stocks of  all ages is the optimal age distribution of machines and can be 
calculated  from (3.2). Note that the initial  stock is  0  and that the result  can be 
viewed as a function of the tax parameter r.  This yields 
(7) 
The marginal  changes  of  these stocks with respect  to the tax rate r  are given by 
Therefore, an increase in the emission tax reduces the number of machines of each 
age  in  the capital  stock, which  implies  that the age distribution  of  machines  is 
shifted downward. This is the downsizing effect of the emission taxes. Furthermore, 
because total emissions are defined as 
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The important questions, however, are (i) whether this downsizing effect is accom- 
panied by a modernization effect, or a change in the shape of the age distribution 
of machines, that increases the productivity of the capital stock, and (ii) how the 
increase in the emission tax affects firm’s profits. 
4.  PRODUCTIVITY  EFFECTS  OF  EMISSION TAXES 
Suppose that the firm has optimized the age distribution of its capital stock, so 
that  the  number  of  machines  for  each  age  is  given  by  (7).  The proportion of 
machines  of  age y  in the aggregate optimal capital stock of the firm is defined as 
h 
Note that f(y,  7)  is a density function, because  f(y, 7)  E 10, 11, 1  f(y,  7)  dy = 1. 
The average age of the optimal capital stock is defined as 
0 
The basic  question  is under which conditions an increase in the tax rate reduces 
the average age of the capital stock, or dg(T)/dT < 0. 
PROPOSITION  1.  A  stricter  environmental policy  reduces  the average  age  of  the 
optimal capital stock if and only if the average age of  the optimal capital stock before 
the tax increase is less than the acerage age of  the change in the capital stock (which is 
a reduction as the firm  downsizes in response to an increase in the tax rate), or 
<” 
For a proof see the Appendix. 
The  proposition  is  intuitively  clear, because  removing  on  average  more  older 
machines  reduces the average age, but the formulation is useful for what follows. 
Under the condition of the foregoing proposition the downsizing of the firm also 
causes modernization  of  the capital stock. The optimal average age is reduced, as 
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To analyse  the productivity  effects  from a  reduction in the average  age, we 
define the average productivity of the capital stock as 
n-(r)  =  .>  dY 
Using  a  decreasing  linear  productivity  function,  defined  as  c(y)  = a -  py with 
p > 0, we have that 
In  that  case,  stricter  environmental  policy,  in  the  form  of  a  higher  tax  rate, 
increases the productivity of the capital stock when the average age of the capital 
stock is reduced. The earlier proposition gives the condition for this to take place. 
We  will  investigate  this  condition  for  general  linear  functional  forms for  the 
variables of the problem. The linearity assumption might not always be realistic but 
the analysis becomes already quite complex. To investigate whether the results are 
generalizable to nonlinear functional forms is left for further research. 
Consider the case where 
u(y)  = a, + a,(h -y), 
c(y)  = c, 
b(Y)  = b(h  -Y>9 
S(Y) =so +sly, 
where all the parameters are nonnegative and at least  a, or s1 is strictly positive. 
This implies that acquisition  costs b decline linearly with age y  of  the machines 
and running costs c of the machines are constant. Output u  is linearly decreasing 
with age y  while emissions  s are linearly increasing, with at least one of them in a 
strict way. The following proposition can then be stated. 
Under the assumptions made earlier about the functional forms of 
output, running costs, acquisition costs, and emissions, an increase in the emission tax 
reduces the optimal average age of  the capital stock and increases its average productiu- 
ity. For a proof see the Appendix. 
Thus when  the downsizing  effect  is  accompanied  by  a  modernization  effect  a 
stricter  environmental  policy can increase  the average productivity of  the capital 
stock. It should be noticed, however, that the increase  in productivity cannot  be 
solely  attributed  to a  stricter  environmental  policy.  In  case,  for  example,  that 
running costs c increase linearly with age y  of the machines, it can be shown that 
in the absence of  environmental policy, an exogenous upward shock to these costs 
also  increases  productivity. The result  appears again  because  of  a  more general 
mechanism which is associated with a downsizing of the industry due to an increase 
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in costs and an accompanying modernization of the capital stock in the course of 
the downsizing process. As with X-efficiency, the positive effects may be caused by 
an external shock in general and not exclusively one in relation with an environ- 
mental problem. 
A  stricter  environmental policy can  thus  increase  the average  productivity  of 
capital and reduce emissions at the same time. These effects can, however, not be 
regarded as a win-win  situation unless the effects of emission taxes on profits are 
positive as well. 
5. PROFIT  EFFECTS  OF  EMISSION  TAXES 
In order to analyse the profit effects of emission taxes, we consider a case where 
the  firm  subject  to  the  environmental  tax  represents  the  home  industry.  This 
industry competes with a similar industry in another country which is not subject to 
the environmental tax  7. 
Given  the price  p  and the steady-state optimal  age  distribution  of  machines 
given by  (7) total output for the home industry is given by 
hYh 
(4Y)X*(YJ)  dY  = J  002  J J  C(Y)[PU(  p) -  c( p) -  TS( p)]  dpdzdy 
Suppose that the demand for the output of the home industry and the industry 
abroad comes from a third country according to the linear demand schedule, 
p  =F -  (Ll(Y)X*(Y,T) dy -  Jh'-(Y)X*(Y>O)  0  dy. 
The equilibrium price becomes 
P*  =  P17 + Po. 
where 
and 
Using  these  expressions  the  steady-state  optimal  age  distribution  of  machines 
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with  [ /J 1;  [ plu( p) -  s(  p)]  dp  dz17 < 0  indicating  the  reduction  in  the  capital 
stock of the home industry due to the downsizing effect of  the environmental tax. 
The environmental tax  7 has a price effect and a cost effect. The change in the 
steady-state  profits  can be split into two parts. A change An,  as a result  of  the 
changes  in  the  price,  the  cost  of  emission  taxes,  and  the  age  distribution  of 
machines, and a change An, as a result of the changes in the transactions on the 
machine market. 
The first change in profits becomes 
Because the net result from transactions  on the machine market is given by 
WY)  -  a[IhrPU(  P> - 4  P> -  74  PI1  dP 
Y 
the second change in profits becomes 
In order to obtain a tractable  expression for the total change in profits  AII(71, 
Lemma  1 from the Appendix is used. By  renaming  y  into  p  and by  renaming  z 
into y  in the right-hand side of Lemma 1 it is easy to see that the second term of 
AII, and the second  term of  AII, cancel  out, and that the total  change in the 
steady-state profits can be written as 
A~(T>  = r17‘ + r07, 
where 
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Thus the change in profits is a quadratic function of the environmental tax r,  with 
AII(0) = 0.  With  an  increasing  environmental  tax  r  the  profits  n  decrease 
monotonically  until  the  steady-state  optimal  age  distribution  of  machines  has 
decreased to zero. In the interval from r = 0 until the value rnlax  > 0, at which the 
resulting  machine  distribution  is  zero,  the  change  in  profits  is  negative  and 
decreasing in the environmental tax r, 
With an increasing  environmental tax  r  total emissions S  also decrease according 
to6 
Having  established  that stricter  environmental  policy reduces  both profits  and 
emissions in the home industry, we now turn to examine  the relative  effects of  a 
stricter environmental policy when the downsizing of the home industry is or is not 
accompanied by  a modernization  of the capital stock. We compare two cases: In 
the first, the benchmark  case, the productivity  of  the machines  is  constant  and 
therefore  no modernization  is  possible.  In the second  case  the newer  machines 
have  a higher  productivity so that a stricter  environmental  policy can generate a 
modernization  effect.  Emissions  are kept  constant  over  age in  the two  cases.  It 
would  be  more realistic  to assume  that  older  machines  emit  more than newer 
machines, but this would only strengthen the results that follow. 
Consider as a benchmark the case where all machines have the same productiv- 
ity  u(y)  = a,  the same running costs c(y) = c (=  01, the same emissions  s(y) = s, 
and acquisition  costs  b(y)  = b(h -y) to reflect  that newer  machines  last longer. 
The benchmark  is  compared with  the  case  where  the machines’  productivity 
decreases with age according to ~(y)  = a, + a,(h -  y). It is easy to show that this 
specification leads to the same total output and equilibrium price po  before tax as 
in the benchmark case, if  the parameters of the specification satisfy 
8 
3h 
a, = da,  a, = -(1  -  d)a,  d E[O,l), 
and the acquisition costs become 
It is to be  expected  that  the parameter  of  the acquisition  costs  is  higher  for a 
downward sloping productivity than for a constant productivity. From Proposition 2 
it follows that an increase in the emission tax, for these specifications, increases the 
average productivity of the capital stock through the modernization effect. 
‘Note  that in  order to  determine  the  optimal  tax  it is necessary  to determine  the  costs  of  total 
emissions to society. The purpose of this paper is, however, to analyse the effect of a nonhomogeneous 
capital stock, for which such a valuation is not necessary. ENVIRONMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS  177 
Suppose that now an environmental tax  r  is levied. 
In the benchmark case the equilibrium price becomes p" =pfr  +po  with 
while for the varying productivity case the equilibrium price becomes p'  = 
with  + po 
+ash3 
1 + $[l + (&)(l -  d)2]a2h3f 
P; = 
Using this framework the following proposition can be stated 
PROPOSITION  3.  Let ~S"(T)/~T,  dS' (T)/~T,  and dn'(~)/d~,  dII' (T)/~T  de- 
note the marginal decreases in emissions and profits by a stricter environmental policy 
in the home countiy, in the benchmark and  uaiying productiuity cases, respectiuely. 
Then under the assumptions made preuiously  , 
For a proof see the Appendix. 
Thus when the industry can change the composition of its capital stock by buying 
newer more productive  machines, and this action is induced by  a stricter environ- 
mental  policy the reduction  in  emissions is larger  and the reduction  in profits  is 
smaller as compared to the case where no such action is possible. Therefore it can 
be  stated  that  when  the  downsizing  of  the  home  industry  due  to  a  stricter 
environmental  policy is accompanied  by  modernization  of  its capital stock, there 
are smaller  losses  in  profits  and there are greater gains  in  emission  reductions 
relative to the case where modernization is not possible. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a model in which firms can invest in machines with different characteris- 
tics,  where  newer  machines  are more productive  and  "cleaner"  but  also  more 
expensive than older machines, we isolated two effects resulting from the introduc- 
tion  of  a  stricter  environmental  policy  in  the  form  of  a  tax  on  emissions:  A 
productivity effect and a profit-emission  effect. 
The productivity  effect  implies  that if  the downsizing  of  the firm  due to the 
stricter  environmental  policy  is  accompanied  by  a  modernization  effect,  which 
means  a  reduction  in  the  average  age  of  the  capital  stock,  then  the  average 
productivity of the capital stock increases. 
The profit-emission  effect indicates that profits and emissions decrease with a 
stricter  environmental  policy. However, in the case that the capital stock can be 
composed of  newer more productive machines and older less productive  machines 
the effect of an environmental  tax is better in two ways, as compared to the case 
where modernization  of the capital stock is not possible: the marginal  decrease in 
emissions is higher and the marginal decrease in profits is lower. 178  XEPAPADEAS AND  DE ZEEUW 
Therefore,  our  results  indicate  that  although  a  stricter  environmental  policy 
cannot  be expected to provide a win-win  situation  in the sense of both reducing 
emissions  and increasing  profitability  in  an industry,  we  may  expect  increased 
productivity of the capital stock along with a relatively less severe impact on profits 
and more emission reductions, when the stricter  policy induces modernization  of 
the capital stock. The trade-off  between  environmental  conditions and profits of 
the home industry remains but is less sharp because of downsizing and moderniza- 
tion of the industry. 
APPENDIX  A 
Proof  of  Proposition 1.  The proposition follows by taking the derivative, 
setting  the numerator less than zero and rearranging  terms, where  it  should be 
noted that the change in the capital stock is negative. 
LEMMA  1.  The following holds: 
Pro05 
Proof  of  Proposition  2. 
Change the order of integration  of  z and y. 
Proposition  1 are developed separately. The first term becomes 
First, the terms of  the two  ratios  of  the condition  of 
-((b(z)  dzdy. 
By  Lemma  1 and then changing  the  order  of  integration,  the first  part  of  this 
expression for a,  can be written as ENVIRONMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS  179 
By  changing the order of  integration, the second part of a,  can be written as 
jhjyb(z)dzdy=  jhjhb(z)dydz= (  h (h-z)b(z)dz. 
00  02 
Combining these two results we obtain 
0, = jh  [(hp -  +P2)[PU( P) -  c( P) 
0 
Similarly, the second term becomes 
a,  = jhYX(YJ)  0  dY 
= jh  [+(h2,,  -  3P3)[P4  P) -  c( P) 
0 
Furthermore, 
h  dX(y2.r)  hYh 
03=  j  0  d?-  =-/,J,J,  P)  dp  dZdY  1 
or, by  using Lemma 1 and then changing the order of integration, 
a3  = -jhj"(h  -z)s(p)dpdz 
02 
= -jhjf  (h  -  z)s(  p)  dzdp = -[  (hp -  +p2)s( p)  dp. 
00 
Similarly, 
h  dx(y,?-)  h 
dy = -  j  pp  -  ip3)s( p)  dp.  04  = j  Y  d7 
0  0 
It follows that the condition of  Proposition  1, O,/O, < a4/a3,  becomes 
For  u( p) = a, c( p) = c, b( p) = b(h -  p), and  s(  p) = s both the left-hand  side 
and the right-hand side of this inequality are equal to 5h/8. Furthermore, it is easy 
to see that for s( p) = so + s1 p with  s1 > 0 the right-hand side is larger than 5h/8 
and that for u( p) = a, + a, p with  a, > 0 the left-hand side is smaller than 5h/8. 
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Proof  of  Proposition 3.  By  straightforward calculations we obtain 
dSh(  r) -  1 + 3a2h3 




1 + i[l  + (&)(l -  d2)]a2h3 
-  3s2h3. 
1 + $[l  + (&)(l -  d)']a2h3 
~-  - 
Thus it follows that the marginal  decrease in total emissions is larger in the case 
with the varying productivity than in the benchmark case. 
Furthermore, straightforward calculations  show that in the benchmark  case the 
marginal change in steady-state profits becomes 
2  2  3(Poa-c-b)  '  1 
dIIh(  r)  dAIII"(  r)  l+,ah  1232  1 + ia2h3 
- 
dr  -  dr  =  [ 1 + fa2h3] "- 1 + 3a  h 
while for the varying productivity case the result is 
dII"(  r)  dAIIf'(  r) 
dr  dr 
= ijr+ +,  -  - 
where 
3s2h3,  I 
1 + i[l  + (&)(l  -  d2)]a2h3 
1 + i[l  + (&)(l -  d)']u2A3 
2,.223 
ij=  (&)(l -  d)  p1  h  + 
and 
1 + i[l  + (&)(l -  d2)]a2h3 
1 + f[l  + (&)(l  -  d)']a2h3  Poa  &-  = -  ish3 
(c  + bl) .  1 
1 + i[l  + (&)(1 -  d2)]a2h3 
1 + $[l  + (&)(l -  d)']uZh3 
- 
Thus it follows that the marginal decrease in profits is already smaller for r = 0 in 
the varying  productivity case  as compared to the benchmark,  and the difference 
grows with an increasing environmental tax. 
APPENDIX  B:  LIST  OF  SYMBOLS 
Y  age of a machine 
h  maximum age of a machine 
t  time 
4.Y)  output of a machine of age y 
a,, a,, d,  a  parameters of  u(y) ENVIRONMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS  181 
running cost of a machine of age y 
parameter of  c(y> 
emissions of a machine of age y 
parameters of  s(y> 
number of machines  of age y  operating in year t 
total output in year  t 
emission tax per unit emissions 
total running costs for year  t 
total emissions 
buying cost of a machine of  age y 
parameters of  b(y) 
number of machines  of age y  bought or sold in year  t 
price of output 
parameters of the equilibrium price 
generalized Hamiltonian 
adjoint state or benefits from installing one machine of age y  at time t 
constant of integration 
optimal 
proportion of machines  of age y  in the optimal capital stock 
average age of the optimal capital stock 




parameters of change in steady-state profits 
benchmark case 
varying productivity case 
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